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Abstract
This paper explores the world business cycle using unltered data from 1870 and looks for a
theory that could account for the long wave commodity cycle in the world economy. We build a
simple DSGE model that includes a long time-to-build constraint in the commodity sector. We nd
that this model can produce long cycles in output and commodity prices as introduced by Kontradie¤
(1925) and Schumpeter (1935). Our ndings show that these long business cycles are produced by
the long gestation of commodity capacity which causes very large swings in commodity prices.
Keywords: Long waves; commodities; DSGE model; Indirect Inference
JEL classication: E10; E32; E52
1 Introduction: the world business cycle and the long wave
The goal of this paper is to consider the world business cycle and specically relate it to two main shocks:
from materials productivity, and from money supply policy. Most macroeconomists think of the business
cycle as of fairly short duration, perhaps between 5 and 10 years from peak to peak. This could well be
true at a national level because of the variety of shocks that can trigger recession for a smaller, national,
unit. One can use data lters, such as the Hodrick-Prescott lter, with a lter window such that cycles
are generated at such frequencies. Such lters can do the same thing at the level of the world economy.
However, if one looks at unltered world data from around 1870 to the present day, which is our data
sample here, one can discern a series of very long output cycles, with the length on the upswing of some
20 years length. Figure 1 shows world output annual growth from 1870; if one takes uninterrupted spells
of positive annual growth (i.e spells with no year of negative growth) there are four such upswings in
the sample, 1877-1892, 1894-1907, 19471974 and 19832008. The omitted periods are two downswings,
1973-1982 and 2009-2012; and also the period including the two world wars, 1908-1945, a period of sharp
and mostly short swings, including the 1930s Great Depression. What we see from this data, excluding
that war period, is that on this admittedly crude denition of a recession as annual negative growth, we
have an average upswing of 21 years and an average downswing of about 7 years, a total average cycle
length of 28 years. The war period, with its several short cycles, brings down this average. However,
what we draw attention to here is the presence of several long cycles.
Two prominent economists in the past two centuries have urged the presence of long cycles; both
have been largely ignored in recent macroeconomics. One, Kondratie¤ (1925; see also Kondratie¤ and
Stolper,1935), wrote in the Soviet Union. The other, Schumpeter (1935), was for many years professor
at Harvard where he wrote several books about growth and the business cycle. Two of his big macroeco-
nomic ideas were the role of creative destruction in productivity growth and the e¤ect of commodity
long waves on the business cycle. One can see creative destruction at work in commodity innovation
where new materials simply push aside the old one, as iron and steel pushed away wood, or polypropy-
lene sisal and jute; but here we do not focus on this idea about the source of growth as our productivity
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Figure 1: World GDP Growth (Source: Maddison, 2010)
change in the model is entirely exogenous. Both these economists connected the business cycle and the
long cycles in it to the behaviour of commodity prices where indeed one can see plain evidence of long
cycles, the focus of this paper. Figure 2 shows the data for real non-oil and oil commodity prices over
the same sample. If one takes the non-oil as representative throughout the period, one can discern ve
peaks, 1873, 1917, 1951, 1974 and 2011, implying a peak to peak average cycle length of around 35 years.
If one examines real oil prices after WW2, there are two peaks, 1974 and 2011, implying just one long
cycle of 37 years peak to peak. There are also short periods of cyclical movement within these long
cycles.
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Figure 2: Commodities (Source: Mitchell 1971 and World Bank)
It is tempting to believe that there is a strong connection between these two long cycles, in output
and in commodity prices.
There is much previous work on the behaviour of the world economy and long cycles. On the one
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hand, there is an extensive literature devoted to identifying a long wave cycle. The initial decomposition
method used by Goldstein (1988), for example, aimed at isolating major uctuations in the deviations
of a macroeconomic variable around its trend through a combination of detrending procedures and
smoothing techniques. This method however was criticised for relying heavily on ad-hoc assumptions
about the form of the trend or the predenition of historical phase periods. Amongst many alternatives,
spectral analysis appears as one of the dominant methods. This method can simultaneously break down
any time series into a set of cyclical components having di¤erent frequencies. Using this method Van
Ewijk (1982) nds evidence of Kondratie¤ waves. In particular, Van Ewijk nds the existence of a long
wave in prices, but not in real variables for the UK, US, France and Germany. The other dominant
method for detecting long waves is the lter design approach. In this method, as in spectral analysis,
a time series is considered as the result of the summation of di¤erent frequencies and the task of the
lter consists of determining the lter coe¢cients so as to isolate specic frequencies and to show the
course of pre-specied frequency components in the time domain (Baxter and King, 1999; Christiano
and Fitzgerald, 2003). There is also a vast literature that takes the existence of long wave cycles as given
and tries to explain the long wave cycle. Rostow (1978, 1980) constructs a model where a scarcity or
surplus of basic commodities generated a Kondratie¤ type wave in prices, GNP and real wages. The
swings depend on the assumption of parameters for the elasticity of substitution between capital, labour,
and raw materials. Forrester (1979) used a complicated "National Model" and nds that each major
expansion grows around a highly integrated and mutually supporting combination of technologies. He
nds that the long wave process culminates in excess debt and overbuilding of capital sectors, followed by
depression when the excess capital plant is worn out and nancially depreciated. Further, Graham and
Senge (1980) nd that near the peak of the wave, major industries su¤er decreasing returns to capital
and are vulnerable to government regulation. As the economy slides into depression, opportunities arise
for waves of inventions. That is, there is a close correlation between primary energy source substitution
and waves of innovation. Around the same time, Marchetti (1980) shows that the prices of fuels rise
in coincidence with the apex of each long wave cycle. Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) develop
a theoretical model to link the two types of uctuations, the business cycle and long swing expansions
and crises. The model is based on the idea that swings are due to the social institutions in place:
these determine economic and political conditions, which in turn drive prot expectations and capital
accumulation. They nd that the long swing is associated with the non-reproductive cycle, i.e. the cycle
in which the downturn does not correct itself endogenously to restore rapid accumulation conditions for
protability and thus requries institutional changes.
On the other hand there has recently arisen a literature of world macro models mostly involving
two- or three-country models (Laxton and Pesenti, 2003; Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust, 2006; Benigno and
Thoenissen, 2003; Murchison, Rennison and Zhu, 2004; Adolfson et al. 2014). This work has mainly
focused on explaining the uctuations in recent data from the post-war period, and has not explored a
role for long cycles. To our knowledge there is no DSGE model linking the two long cycles of commodity
prices and output and generating this variety of long and occasional short cycles in output at the level
of the world economy. This is what we aim to provide in this paper: a DSGE model in which people
invest in commodity and nal production capacity, consume nal output and hold money controlled by
the governments monetary policy, the key policy element integrated into our model (where we follow
Friedman and Schwarz,1963, by focusing on money creation). Our further aim is to check whether such
a theoretically-based DSGE can account statistically for the data behaviour we observe, inclusing the
long and short cycles we observe.
We are quite limited in our available data (the straw for creation), with the sample starting from
1870. Our model (the bricks we create) is therefore sparing in its use of data and abstracts boldly from
reality, taking quite literally Friedmans adjuration (Friedman, 1953) that models are as if creations
designed to be tested solely on their ability to explain the facts of interest. The data of interest to us is
the cyclical behaviour of output, commodity prices, ination and money supply growth. We use cyclical
to include long swings in the cycle which originate from non-stationary shocks; and we do not lter our
data at all, so that it also includes deterministic as well as stochastic trends.
Our key ndings are that long cycles are produced by the long gestation of commodity capacity.
Because of this long gestation, commodity prices are capable of very large swings; these swings in turn
cause swings in costs for non-commodity industries which act as a source of real business cycle shocks
to output. Investment in the non-commodity sector is subject to quite short lags and so these shocks
cause shorter investment booms and busts in this sector which, in turn, generate short booms and busts
in general output. Monetary policy has some, but rather limited, ability to stabilise these cycles, even
though rigidity in nal prices enables monetary policy feedback to be e¤ective; but it also has a denite
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ability to destabilise, as notably in the Great Depression, and so to generate additional short cycles.
The paper is organised as follows. We describe the model in outline and provide its details in section
2; in section 3 we estimate and test the model, using the not hitherto much used method of indirect
inference which has considerable power in small samples; in section 4 we review the models implications
for the frequency of di¤erent cycle lengths; in section 5 we analyse the possibility of more e¤ective
monetary policy rules than the one we uncover during the sample; section 6 checks the robustness of our
results, before nally concluding.
2 The model
2.1 The model outlined
The structure of the economy is as follows. Households maximise utility by consuming nal output
and holding money. They also produce nal value-added and raw material/commodity and receive the
total income from these productions. Both nal value-added and material output are produced solely by
capital. Labour input and rewards are ignored, i.e. the owning households get total income independent
of any labour input and do not value leisure. Then if labour input is required to deliver the assumed
output members of the household agree to share it equally. We also assume that the world population,
the source of labour supply, is endogenous, responding positively to the supply of resources  a weaker
version of Malthus (1798) where he argued that population would expand to absorb the available supply
of resources. Plainly the worlds great cities, where the mass of the world population (now 7 billion) lives,
could not exist without the support of mass food production, transit, distribution and energy systems,
all of them the product of innovation in primary production.
Households determine their investment for each production so that the expected marginal product
of capital equals the real interest rate. However, there is a time-to-build constraint (following Kydland
and Prescott, 1982) so that the capital stock reects the expected conditions at the time of decision to
build. For the nal value-added production the time-to-build is short  one year. For the commodity
production it is long: we set it at a representative 10 years, even though the facts indicate there is a
wide variety of times to build depending on commodity, from as little as a few years for a synthetic bre
plant to as much as twenty years or more for some copper mines. Clo (2000) states that conventional
discoveries for oil and gas can take 3040 years to develop. In contrast Arezki et al. (2017) show that
for giant oil and gas discoveries the delay between discovery and production averages 5.4 years. For
mining the lead times are longer. Schodde (2014) reports the average delay is 12.4 years, but di¤erent
commodities have di¤erent average delays. For gold the average delay is 10 years, copper 17.1 years,
zinc and lead 15.0 years and uranium 14.7 years; the time delay for copper and gold can range from 1
year to 60 years. Our assumed average of 10 years is subject to our empirical tests and we can vary it in
estimation.
The key element in the expected marginal product is expected commodity prices. When these prices
are expected to be high the return is high for commodity investment but for nal output investment it
is low because of high relative input costs. The problem for these households assessments is that both
productivity in each production and commodity prices are non-stationary variables. In the simplest case
where they are pure random walks the best forecast is the current value. It is this combined with the
long time-to-build that creates the long commodity variation or long cycle: the capital stock today
reects commodity prices 10 years ago, yet since then accumulated shocks could have moved demand
for commodities su¢ciently to move commodity prices well away from those originating values. In
particular, suppose they were high 10 years ago: this will have depressed nal output investment so
that the demands will have tended to fall subsequently. So by today commodity demand may well
be depressed while capacity is high. Commodity prices will tend to be depressed triggering opposite
tendencies for the following ten years. This is, however, just an example. Because the shocks are all
unpredictable it is possible that after ten years the boom will have got even greater.
Households sell nal value-added goods and commodities at the perfect competitive prices, at marginal
cost, to the bundling producers, who bundle these household outputs into nal output in xed Leontief
proportions. These rms are imperfectly competitive and they set their prices in a Calvo manner, at
which they sell this nal output to households. Households demands get translated into bundled output
at these prices and must be satised: the bundling rms transmit these demands back to producing
households who supply them at rising marginal cost by varying the use of capacity, given their capital
as set by previous investment decisions. We think of this capacity utilisation as consisting of using more
shifts on existing capital. The prots of the imperfectly competitive bundling rms are paid in dividends
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to the owning households.
Households consumption demand depends on total income and the real interest rate. Households
utility function also implies a demand for money in terms of money income and interest rates. Money
is supplied by a world central bank (which we can think of as the average of the major money centre
central banks in the developed world, notably the UK and the US, through most of the sample period)
and associated banking system according to a money growth feedback rule: the growth responds to
ination and to output growth, compared with some targets which may be moving over time.
The demand for commodity output is derived from the demand for nal output, and hence is a
function of real (i.e. relative to the price of nal value-added) commodity prices and total income. The
demand for capital equates the expected marginal product once on stream with the current and expected
real interest rate over the period of construction.
There are ve markets in the model: for commodities, for nal value-added output, for gross nal
output, for money and for bonds. By Walras Law, we require four market-clearing conditions. We focus
as usual on the market for commodities, for nal value-added output, for nal output and for money.
Commodity prices equate demand with a function of capacity (where the supply price equals marginal
costs, rising with capacity utilisation). With prices being set in imperfect competition, the supply of
nal output moves to satisfy demand for capital construction plus consumption. The nal value-added
output prices is at marginal cost, the nal prices less the mark-up, to equate its demand from the bundler
with a production function with capacity utilisation. The interest rate equates the demand and supply
of money. There are rational expectations.1
2.2 The model equations
We now turn to a detailed description of the models equations. We assume that the world representative
household receives the net income from both sectors, which equals the value of nal value-added plus
the value of raw materials output; and it spends this on investment in both sectors sector (iF and iM ;
where F= nal sector; M=commodity (materials), consumption (c), bond purchase (b) and real money
balances (m =M=P ). The household maximises
1X
t=0
tU(ct;mt) (1)
subject to
ct + iFt + iMt +Mt=Pt  Mt 1=Pt + bt   (1 + rt 1)bt 1 + t = (
 + t)(YFt   YMt) + pMtYMt +t
where U(ct;mt) =
c
1 
t
1  +t
m
1 
t
1  ;tis an error in liquidity preference, Ptis the price of nal output (used as
the general deator and consumer price index), and 
+ tis the inverse of the bundler mark-up on value-
added (since nal value-added is supplied to bundlers at marginal cost, namely the nal price less this
mark-up, Pt[
+t], where treects the mark-ups uctuations, assumed to be random). So all resources
are measured in units of nal output. pMtis the price of raw materials relative to this deator. tare
the bundling rms prots deated by Pt (T = YFt   (
 + t)(YFt   YMt)  PMtYMt). But households
supply these bundlers atomistically in a perfectly competitive market and so do not individually a¤ect
bundlers prots. YFt YMt = K

Ft uFt and YMt = atK

Mt uMt:where at is productivity in the use of
materials capital and we will denote atK

Mt = YMCAPt, that is materials output capacity at t, planned
at t 10. The terms in u are capacity non-utilisation rates. These arise because price-setting nal-goods
rms must meet demand; they do so with capacity already installed due to previous expectations, and
use it more or less intensively by varying the labour input (e.g. by varying shift patterns). These capacity
utilisation terms enter the Phillips curve as set out below.
The nal output bundling rm produces gross nal output (YFt) using the nal value-added and
the material output (YMt) in a Leontief production function:
YFt = (YFt   YMt) + YMt (2)
where YMt = vYFt. The bundling rms which are imperfectly competitive set prices for this output
in a Calvo manner.
1 It might be asked how one can get cyclical tendencies under rational expectations. The reason is that, although it is
impossible to do better in forecasting, the rigidities of time-to-build create opportunities for shocks to accumulate and so
create booms or busts before investors can respond by changing capacity.
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The investment technology requires time to build new capital. The following identities are for invest-
ment and the capital stock from the time-to-build set-up, where s is an investment project undertaken
that takes in the case of nal capital one year to build and with materials capital ten years, producing
the capital addition at the end:
iFt = sFt; iMt = 0:1(sMt + :::+ sMt 9)
KFt = (1  F )KFt 1 + sFt 1; KMt = (1  M )KMt 1 + sMt 10: (3)
The nal and material capital stocks depreciate at rate F and M ; respectively.
A government prints money and issues (real one-period) bonds, bt, to nance its existing stock of
nominal liabilities and its spending net of its (lump-sum) taxes, t:
(1 + rt 1)Ptbt 1 +Mt 1 = Gt   t +Mt + Ptbt:
We can write the Lagrangean for the household problem,
max L
ct;mt;bt;sFt;sMt;KFt+1;KMt+10
= E0
1X
t=0
t
8
>>>>><
>>>>>:
[
c
1 
t
1  +
m
1 
t t
1  ] + t[ct + sFt + 0:1(sMt + :::+ sMt 9)
+mt  mt 1(Pt 1=Pt + bt   (1 + rt 1)bt 1
+t   (
 + t)K

Ft   pMtatK

Mt + uFt + pMtuMt]
+qt (KFt   (1  F )KFt 1   sFt 1)
+ t
 
KMt   (1  M )KMt 1   sMt 10

9
>>>>>=
>>>>>;
where qtand  tdenote the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the equality constraints (3) :The
rst order conditions are:
ct : 0 =
L
ct
= c t + t (4)
mt : 0 =
L
mt
= m t t + t   
E0t+1
1 + t+1
(5)
bt : 0 =
L
bt
=  t + E0t+1(1 + rt) (6)
sFt : 0 =
L
sFt
= t   qt+1 (7)
KFt : 0 =
L
KFt+1
=  t+1(
 + t+1)K
 1
Ft+1 + qt+1   
2 (1  F ) qt+2 (8)
sMt : 0 =
L
sMt
= 0:1t + 0:1t+1 + :::+ 0:1
9t+9   
10 t+10 (9)
KMt : 0 =
L
KMt+10
=  10t+10K
 1
Mt+1pMt+10at+10 + 
10 t+10   
11 (1  M ) t+11 (10)
where t = Pt=Pt 1   1: Notice that together conditions (7& 8) and (9& 10) imply that investment
equates the expected utility-discounted marginal product of capital (including the e¤ect as it depreciates)
with the current marginal utility of the investment cost. Also as a proxy for all i  year ahead interest
rates at t we use the current (approximately one year) interest rate, 1+ rt: Hence, from these conditions
we obtain:
ct = Etct+i [(1 + rt)]
 
1
 ; (11)
mt = c


t

Rt
1 +Rt
  1


1

t ; (12)
KFt+1 = (
)
1
1  (rt + F )
 1
1  ; (13)
KMt+10 =


'
 1
1 
2
4 (1  (1 + rt))EtpMt+10at+10
1  (1 + rt)
9

(rt + F )
3
5
1
1 
(14)
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From the capital demand equations we can obtain the capital project and investment equations as
sFt = iFt = f1  (i  k)LgKFt+1
and sMt = f1  (1  M )LgKMt+10
so that
iMt = 0:1

1 + L+ :::+ L9
	
f1  (1  M )LgKMt+10
We can also determine the capacity that will prevail in materials in ten years time in a log form as
lnYMCAPt+10 =  lnKMt+10 =

1  
Et [pMt+10 + at+10    rt] (15)
where  =
h
1
r+M
  1
r
  (1+r)
8
1 (1+r)9
i
. Here any covariance between pMt and at would be merged with the
constant term. This is the plan made in this period based on its cost of capital and the expected material
price when the plant has been built.
The rms to which households delegate production have only two tasks: to set prices of nal goods
and to produce the output demanded at these prices, namely the gross nal output (which also determines
the material output). Thus output is demand-determined in the short run; and there is a New Keynesian
Phillips Curve for ination, obtained under the usual Calvo set-up. The ination equation for nal output
is therefore:
t = Ett+1 + (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt) + t (16)
Here the marginal cost term, (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt) = f(1  )[ln(K

Ft)  lnYMCAPt]  uFt=YFt  
uMt=YMtg, where  is the share of materials in nal output. The latter two terms are the e¤ects of rising
capacity utilisation on costs. The rst term measures the pressure on resources, notably land, in countries
where nal output is produced; expansion faster than the growth rate in materials capacity, proxying
the growth rate of local resources, adds to costs. The error term in the Phillips Curve, t, represents
other real marginal costs. Typically these will be correlated with current movements in real commodity
prices and this would be picked up empirically through our vector bootstrapping procedure, whereby
all current innovations are drawn as a vector, so preserving any correlations found in the innovations
extracted from the sample data.
The government follows a money supply growth rule similar to a Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993):
 lnMt = t + (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt) + t (17)
The error here represents both the behaviour of the banking system and the monetary judgements of
the authorities that cause deviations from its normal behaviour. While in the post-war period from the
1980s onwards central banks may well have obeyed a Taylor Rule, for much of our long sample period
the world was on the Gold Standard, certainly from 1860 to 1914 and for much of the inter-war period;
furthermore under Bretton Woods the US maintained a link from the dollar to the price of gold, severed
only in 1971. The Gold Standard enjoined central banks whose gold reserves were low because of excess
demand or ination, to contract the money supply growth rate in order to cause an inow of gold. Hence
if across the world as a whole there is excess demand or ination we should expect central banks in
aggregate to be contracting the money supply growth rate. Nevertheless we must also remember that
the banking system responds to the state of the economy, essentially in a pro-cyclical way; when ination
rises in a period of strong growth, asset prices will rise and banks are encouraged to lend. For this money
supply rule to lean against ination,  should be less than unity; we expect  to be negative so that
monetary policy leans against excess demand.
Taken with the demand for money function from households this money supply function determines
interest rates, Rt; where the demand for money is given by households rst order conditions as:
lnMt=Pt =


ln ct  
1
R
Rt +
1

ln t (18)
We now turn to the market-clearing equations. As we have seen the money market determines Rt:We
then dene as usual as rt = Rt   Ett+1:
The materials market works as follows. Mines producing a raw product from the earths crust, such
as oil or ore are assumed to obey a model following Hotelling (1931) and Nordhaus (1974): there is some
expensive substitute that will be used when this product runs out, and the raw products price is set today
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at the discounted value of that backstop price. Demand is supplied at this price (which is e¤ectively
the price at which it just pays to keep the product in the ground as an investment asset); the higher
the demand and the lower the capacity the faster the product runs out and so the sooner the backstop
price arrives. One can think of this a market-clearing mechanism for resources in xed supply. Thus
higher demand now and in the future set against this xed supply raises prices via bringing the backstop
price into operation earlier. For raw materials that are produced from harvesting a renewable resource,
here assumed to be under perfect competition, the price clears the market where the marginal cost of
production equals the price: this too implies that as demand increases or capacity decreases the price
rises with rising marginal cost and rising capacity utilisation. Hence in both cases the market-clearing
price rises as demand increases and as capacity decreases.
ln pMt =  1 lnYFt    2 lnYMCAPt (19)
For nal output, market-clearing is done by output adjusting to demand given prices that have been
set.
YFt = ct + iFt + iMt +Gt (20)
We can make use of the consumption Euler equation to substitute for c in terms of output and
investment terms, so yielding us the usual forward-looking IS curve. This is done by a) loglinearising the
market-clearing equation (where ec is the share of consumption in GDP, kF is the capital-output ratio
for nal output and kM that for materials output) and using the expressions for iFt and iMt above, to
obtain
lnYFt = ec ln ct + kF [lnKFt+1   (1  F ) lnKFt]
+ 0:1kM (1 + L+ :::+ L
9) (lnKMt+10   (1  M ) lnKMt+9) + gt
and b) substituting from the consumption Euler equation for ln ct to obtain:
lnYFt = Et lnYFt+1  
c

rt + (1 B
 1)(Xt + gt) (21)
Xt = 0:1kM (1 + L+ :::+ L
9)
1
1  

Et (ln pMt+10 + at+10    rt)
  (1  M )Et (ln pMt+9 + at+9    rt 1)

 
kF
(1  )(r + F )
[rt   (1  F ) rt 1] (22)
B 1 is the forward operator leading the variable but not the date of expectation. Since the expected
future change will be converging from the current change towards zero, (1 B 1) dampens the variables
it premultiplies; assuming that the model converges at some approximate constant rate, then this will
act like a simple constant multiplier of less than unity. So the IS curve RHS contains the current level of
interest rates as well as strings of current and lagged changes of interest rates; and also a string of current
and lagged expected, up to 10 years ahead, future changes in raw material prices. gt is the residual of
this aggregate demand equation, in principle the ratio of government (or non-private) spending to world
GDP, and is treated as an error process. This also allows us to rewrite the money demand equation (18)
in term of output as
ln
Mt
Pt
=  
1

 
1 +R

R
Rt +
1

ln t +


1
c
[lnYFt  Xt   gt] (23)
2.3 Loglinearised model
Our model will therefore consist of the following 7 (loglinearised) equations in 7 variables, (P ); YF ;
R; r; PM ; YMCAPt; M .
Equation (19) determines materials prices this period. The equation depends upon an unobservable
variable, YMCAPt. We reveal this as the (negative of the) residual of this equation:
lnPMt = c1 + a
pm
1 lnYFt + 1t (24)
where 1t =   2 lnYMCAPt. Notice that as we have no data on YMCAP we use this error which we
extract as our measure (up to a multiple) of it.
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Equation (15) determines this periods materials capacity:
lnYMCAPt = c2 + a
ym
1 Et 10 lnPMt   a
ym
2 rt 10 + 2t (25)
Here the error term is the ten years ago expectation of todays productivity.
Equation (21), the forward-looking IS curve, gives:
lnYFt = c3 + Et lnYFt+1   a
y
3rt + (Xt   EtXt+1) + (1  g)3t
Xt = a
y
2[(Et lnPMt+10 + :::+ Et 9 lnPMt+1)  (1  M ) (Et lnPMt+9 + :::+ Et 9 lnPMt)] (26)
  ay1[(rt + :::+ rt 9)  (1  M ) (rt 1 + :::+ rt 10)]  a
y
6[rt   (1  F )rt 1] (27)
Here the error term is the e¤ect of government spending. However, this IS curve is unwieldy and nding
coe¢cients for it that can t the data behaviour has proved an elusive task. We therefore simplify it by
representing the solution for Xt+1 as a truncated ARMA(1,1) process namely Xt+1 = jXt + t+1 +mt
to give Xt   EtXt+1 = (1  j)Xt +mt, with t swept into the IS error term.
We then use (17) and (23) to yield the demand and supply of money as:
ln(Mt=Pt) = c4 + a
md
1 (lnYFt  Xt   3t)  a
md
2 Rt + 4t (28)
 lnMt = c5 + a
ms
1 t   a
ms
2 (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt) + 5t (29)
These two equations solve for Rt and Mt respectively.
We use equation (16) for ination as:
t = c6 + Ett+1 + a

2 (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt) + 6t
(The price level is derived from the ination rate.) The error term here is the shifting Calvo mark-up
and also any error in our marginal cost specication.  is rms time preference rate which we expect to
be substantially lower than households because of rm entry and innovation.
Finally, we have the identity linking real and nominal interest rates:
rt = Rt   Ett+1
Rational expectations prevail for the expected terms.
We can represent the resulting model as the following 7 (loglinearised) equations:
Materials Prices: lnPMt = c1 + a
pm
1 lnYFt   lnYMCAPt (30)
Materials Capacity: lnYMCAPt = c2 + a
ym
1 Et 10 lnPMt + 2t (31)
IS Curve: lnYFt = c3 + Et lnYFt+1 + a
y
2Xt + a
y
3rt + 3t (32)
Money Demand: ln(Mt=Pt) = c4 + amd1 lnYFt + a
md
2 Rt + 4t (33)
Money Supply:  lnMt = c5 + ams1 t + a
ms
2 (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt) + 5t (34)
Phillips Curve: t = c6 + Ett+1 + a2 (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt) + 6t (35)
Fisher Equation: rt = Rt   Ett+1 (36)
where: Xt = (Et 1PMt+9 + :::+ Et 10PMt) (37)
3 Model Estimation
3.1 Data
Using unltered data from 1870 2008 (see Figure 3) we estimate the model using the method of Indirect
Inference as in Le et al. (2011)2 . As the data is non-stationary we use a VECM as the auxiliary model
with output, ination and materials prices as endogenous variables and the non-stationary materials
capacity shock and a deterministic time trend as exogenous variables. In the calculation of the Wald
statistic we include the parameters on the exogenous terms in order to match the long-run trends seen
in the data.
2For a full account of indirect inference methods and available computer programmes see Le et al. (2016a)
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Figure 3: World Data (1870-2008)
A full set of data sources is in the Table 1. The commodity prices are based on widely used indices,
deated into real terms. Output, money, interest rates and consumer prices are a weighted average of
UK and US data as these two countries were the two main world trading economies and money centres
throughout the period. Plainly this raises issues of the role of omitted countries and we address this in
a robustness test where we substitute world weighted series for all these, where all developed countries
are included with GDP weights; the results with these series are virtually unchanged. We take this as
indirect conrmation of our assumption that the world environment was essentially shaped by the two
major money and trade centres.
Variable Source
Output
Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD
(Copyright Angus Maddison)
Ination
Average of US CPI and UK RPI
(measuringworth.com)
Interest Rate
Average of US and UK short term rate (contemporary)
(measuringworth.com)
Money Supply
UK: The UK recession in context  what do three centuries of data tell us? Ryland Thomas
US: Monetary Statistics of the United States. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz
Commodities Prices
British Historical Statistics B. R. Mitchell for pre 1960
World Bank for post 1960
Table 1: Data Sources
3.2 Estimation
Table 2 shows the key parameters as estimated as well as the Wald statistic and its p-value. The Wald
statistic tests whether the model can jointly match the coe¢cients on the VECM produced by the data.
We nd that the model ts adequately, with the p-value of 0.06 showing the model is well away from
being rejected by the data.
The IS curve has the unit forward coe¢cient on future output and since the real interest rate is highly
persistent this implies that its e¤ect inclusive of the forward e¤ect is rather high; if one assumes that it
has an average AR coe¢cient of 0.9, then the long run slope of the IS curve (@R=@y) would be -0.4. The
LM curves short run and long run slope is 0.5.
The model can therefore be understood as having a forward-looking IS curve that reacts positively to
expected future raw material prices via increased commodity investment, and negatively to real interest
rates. The LM curve is shifted by the growth of the real money supply. The Phillips Curve is of normal
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Key Parameters Estimated
Elasticity of Materials Prices to nal output apm1 0:97
Elasticity of Materials Capacity to expected materials prices aym1 0:35
IS curve - semi-elasticity to future materials prices ay2 0:09
- semi-elasticity to real interest rate ay3  0:22
Money Demand - elasticity to consumption amd1 1:73
- semi-elasticity to interest rates amd2  3:50
Money Supply growth - semi-elasticity to ination ams1 0:17
- elasticity to output gap ams2  0:01
Phillips Curve - response to expected ination  0:58
- response to output gap a2 0:62
Shocks: Materials Productivity pm 0:13
IS Curve y 0:92
Money Demand md 0:99
Money Supply Growth ms 0:55
Phillips Curve  0:93
Wald statistic 37:08
p-value 0:06
Table 2: Estimated Parameters
dimensions, with a high response to expected future ination and a fair-sized response to the output
gap. There is a 10-year delay before any commodity investment changes raw material capacity; once this
delayed capacity is triggered, it shifts the Phillips Curve to the right, lowering ination and stimulating
demand/output, pushing the IS/LM intersection rightwards towards the new higher capacity.
Table 3 shows the coe¢cients from the auxiliary model alongside their 95% bounds from the sim-
ulations. The auxiliary model is a VECM with productivity and a deterministic trend as the drivers
of the data ensuring cointegration. We also include the variances of the residuals from the VECM in
our set of coe¢cients we are trying to match. We nd that as well as the model jointly matching the
coe¢cients they, on the whole, also match individually. The variance of the output residual is lower than
the bounds, and the variance of the ination residual is just outside the lower bound.
Actual Lower Bound Upper Bound IN?
Y_Y(-1) 0:94264 0:51935 1:04548 IN
PI_Y(-1) 0:02258  0:04615 0:42267 IN
PM_Y(-1) 0:18834  0:35910 0:88359 IN
Y_PI(-1)  0:06170  0:41401 0:01390 IN
PI_PI(-1) 0:64408 0:50019 0:86760 IN
PM_PI(-1) 0:29192  0:55938 0:49092 IN
Y_PM(-1) 0:00389  0:13735 0:40853 IN
PI_PM(-1) 0:00253  0:31545 0:14406 IN
PM_PM(-1) 0:89104 0:08809 1:35801 IN
Y_A(-1)  0:01080  0:10572 0:40925 IN
PI_A(-1) 0:00676  0:36819 0:06432 IN
PM_A(-1)  0:01037  0:76949 0:39937 IN
Y_T 0:00144  0:00213 0:01979 IN
PI_T  0:00032  0:01814 0:00191 IN
PM_T  0:00433  0:03672 0:01553 IN
var(Y) 0:00114 0:00225 0:00498 OUT
var(PI) 0:00119 0:00121 0:00287 OUT
var(PM) 0:02420 0:00615 0:03409 IN
Table 3: Auxiliary Model (VECM) coe¢cients and bounds
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3.3 Residuals and Innovations Extracted
Figure 4 shows the single equation residuals that result from the parameter estimates. We treat materials
productivity as being non-stationary, and the rest as trend-stationary (apart from money supply which
is stationary). The persistence of the shocks are shown in Table 2.
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Figure 4: Residuals
The innovations we use to shock the model are shown in Figure 5. Over such a long sample we nd
there are periods of calm, and periods of high volatility. The materials capacity and IS curve shocks are
highly volatile during the 1970s. This is caused by the sharp rise in the price of materials which was
mainly due to the shortage of oil. Similarly the Phillips Curve shock is highly volatile during the same
period. Money supply growth and money demand shocks are, however, biggest before WW2.
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Figure 5: Innovations
Notice that when we bootstrap these shocks we do so by time vector, that is to say we draw all the
innovations for one period together when we randomly select shocks. This preserves any simultaneous
correlation between them which may well be important because a single event source can trigger shocks
all over the economy  think of the recent nancial crisis.
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3.4 Why use Indirect Inference?
Indirect Inference is a relatively unfamiliar method of estimation and testing. We use it here because
we need a method that will powerfully reject a mis-specied model in the small sample that we have
(around 140 annual observations). The two main alternatives today are Bayesian estimation with strong
priors or Maximum Likelihood (equivalent to Bayesian estimation with at priors).
The former is an appropriate method when much is already known about the issue at hand, so that
priors can be set out that command general assent; often the case in the physical sciences and indeed in
some parts of the social sciences. However, this condition does not apply here: the macroeconomics of
the world economy is not much explored and remains controversial.
Maximum Likelihood estimation is based on minimising the models now-casting prediction errors
and its associated test is based on the likelihood implied by these errors. The two main di¢culties of
this method are rst that it exhibits high estimation bias in small samples and second that the power of
the test in small samples is also rather limited and in particular its power to reject a mis-specied model
is close to zero, because such a model can be tted closely to the data, so creating small errors. Le et
al (2016a) carried out a Monte Carlo comparison of this method with Indirect Inference, treating the
widely used Smets and Wouters (2007) model of the US as the true model, and concluded that Indirect
Inference o¤ered very low bias and potentially large power. The method involves rst describing the data
behaviour in the sample by an auxiliary model, for which we use a VECM; and then simulating the
DSGE model by bootstrapping its innovations to create many parallel samples (or histories) from each
of which implied auxiliary model coe¢cients are estimated, generating a distribution of these coe¢cients
according to the DSGE model. We then ask whether the VECM coe¢cients found in the actual data
sample (actual history) came from this distribution with a high enough probability to pass the test
threshold (which we put at 5%).
In our VECM auxiliary model we use three variables  total output, ination and raw materials
prices. We choose these three variables after a check on the power of our test for di¤erent sets of
variables. We nd (Table 4) that the tests power with this three-variable VECM is high  rejecting
a model 100% of the time if it is only on average 13% false (we generate this increasing x-percentage
falsity by alternately lowering and raising parameters from their true values by x%). Hence adding
any more variables would raise the power to unacceptably high levels at which we risk never nding a
tractable model that ts. As far as di¤erent three-variable sets are concerned, we have found in other
work that the results are robust to any shifts in choice; what matters is now many variables are used
(Meenagh,Minford, Wickens and Xu, 2018).3
Falseness Rejection Rate
1% 5:38%
3% 7:00%
5% 14:7%
7% 47:16%
10% 94:82%
13% 99:96%
15% 100:00%
Table 4: Power of the Indirect Inference Test
4 Impulse Response Functions and the models workings
Figures 69 shows the IRFs for the main shocks. The materials productivity shock is non-stationary
and therefore has a permanent e¤ect on all variables. The Phillips Curve shock to ination is stationary
but will have a non-stationary e¤ect on money and prices. Similarly the money supply growth shock is
stationary but also has a permanent e¤ect on money and prices.
First, the rise in capacity lowers ination and raw material prices and through both stimulates
demand, shifting the IS and LM curves to the right. As nal output converges on raw material capacity
raw material prices return to the same equilibrium. No further capacity is invested in therefore.
Secondly, the rightward shift of the IS curve along the LM curve raises output, and via the Phillips
Curve raises ination; with money supply growth rising little as it reacts negatively to the output gap,
3 Including four endogenous variables in the auxiliary model results in a model being only 5% false getting rejected 100%
of the time.
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Figure 6: IRFs for a Materials Productivity Shock (nonstationary)
the fall in real money balances raises interest rates which reverses the output rise within ve years. The
rise in rates persists because the rise in prices is reversed only slowly by mild disination; commodity
prices rise but fall back close to zero and hardly disturb commodity investment. In e¤ect the IS curve
shift is crowded out rapidly by higher interest rates.
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Figure 7: IRFs for an IS curve shock
Third, the rise in money supply growth shifts the LM curve to the right along the IS curve, both
stimulating ination via the Phillips curve and so shifting the IS curve to the right by lowering real interest
rates. Raw material prices rise but this rise dies out quickly as output also falls back, with prices catching
up with money to reduce real balances back to equilibrium. Commodity capacity therefore hardly moves;
nominal interest rates also hardly move, with both IS and LM curves reverting to equilibrium quickly.
Monetary policy is therefore powerful as in Friedman and Schwarz (1963), directly feeding into output
and ination. (The money demand shock has qualitatively the same e¤ects but the innovation variance
is very small so that it is of little importance quantitatively.)
Notice that all the shocks we have considered so far have e¤ects that die out rather quickly; within 5
years output is back close to equilibrium (this is permanently changed with the productivity shock; but
the point is that output quickly achieves this new position).
Finally, in the case of the Phillips Curve shock, which is to be thought of as a persistent rise in
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Figure 8: IRFs for a Money Supply Growth shock
mark-up or other costs, ination rises driving down the real money supply, shifting the LM curve sharply
to the left. At this point the model searches for a response of output that can accommodate both the
rise in costs and the contractionary e¤ect of lower real balances. We can think of this as a shift in
the forward-looking IS curve to the left. Output falls persistently and drives down raw material prices
setting o¤ a fall in commodity investment, culminating in lower raw material capacity in ten years time.
The output contraction drives interest rates, both nominal and real, downwards. The fall in commodity
capacity eventually restores commodity prices to equilibrium, and output too reverts to equilibrium as
the shock dies away. But this whole process takes over 40 years.
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Figure 9: IRFs for a Phillips Curve shock
One can see from these IRFs that output responds most to the materials and Phillips curve shocks 
as does ination. The IS curve shock has its main e¤ect on ination and interest rates. These responses
are reected in the variance decomposition and the historical timelines, to which we now turn.
4.1 Variance decomposition and timelines
The variance decomposition (Table 5) shows that shocks to raw material capacity and the Phillips curve
a¤ect output and ination the most. The IS curve shock also contributes to ination variance and with
15
the Phillips curve shock is important for interest rate variance.
PMt YMCAPt YFt Mt Pt t Rt
Materials Productivity shock 11:90 99:27 79:76 17:10 75:94 63:60 30:43
IS Curve shock 0:48 0:00 0:09 0:16 0:75 2:23 35:70
Money Demand shock 0:03 0:00 0:01 0:04 0:19 0:15 0:18
Money Supply growth shock 0:70 0:00 0:13 75:68 8:82 4:20 0:40
Phillips Curve shock 86:90 0:73 20:02 7:01 14:30 29:82 33:29
Table 5: Variance Decomposition
Next we look at the historical timeline analysis for the the main variables. First, we show two timelines
for output: the rst (Figure 10) includes the (data-based) deterministic trend, the second (Figure 11)
abstracts from this, only including the shocks including the model-based stochastic trends. The role of
money in stimulating the economy in the 1920s and deating it in the 1930s can be seen in the yellow
bars. However, this was an exceptional period; all the rest of the history output is dominated by the
productivity shock (dark blue) and the cost shocks to the Phillips curve (dark green).
Figure 10: Timeline for Output with data-based trend
Figure 11: Timeline for Output
The timeline for ination in Figure 12 shows how according to the model it was dominated by materials
productivity and the Phillips Curve shock, itself probably related to raw material price movements; this
is because these two shocks are intertwined  when commodity prices rise they act as an impulse shock
to other costs in ination.
Ination was quiescent until WW1 while the Gold Standard was operating: from that point it becomes
disturbed by materials, cost, money supply and IS shocks which produce large uctuations in used-up
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capacity, Y- YMCAP. The biggest uctuation in this capacity measure is during the 1970s and early
1980s when the world experienced double-digit ination and the oil/commodity crisis. These uctuations
even exceeded those in the interwar and WW2 periods.
Figure 12: Timeline for Ination
Figure 13 shows that interest rates were driven up in the 1970s by raw material shortage and IS
demand stimulus (which a¤ects interest rates more or less exclusively); and driven down in the 1930s by
the same forces.
Interest rates are the equilibrating variable setting money demand equal to money supply: money
supply growth accommodates ination to some extent and leans somewhat against output, hence is
largely exogenous. But as we have seen shocks to it have had little impact on the economy except in the
thirties. It is uctuations in money demand, responding to ination and output, that have caused the
uctuations in rates- where the LM curve has shifted up and down the steep IS curve. Hence the shocks
to the Phillips and IS curves as well as materials productivity have been the shocks driving rates.
Figure 13: Timeline for Interest Rate
4.2 The length of cycles revealed by the model
What is the behaviour of the simulated samples, in terms of their cycle lengths and the propensity of
the world economy to crises? We investigate this with the many bootstrap histories we have created by
simulating the DSGE model repeatedly: these histories taken as a whole can give us the pricture of what
the world economy could have done according to the DSGE model and in particular the cycles it could
have created. We nd that cycle lengths vary in a way conjectured by Schumpeter. We get frequent long
wave cycles, as well as shorter cycles. The frequency of the cycles is shown in various ways in Table 6
and Figure 14. Table 6 shows the percentage of cycles that are of length between [a,b], as well as the
number of these cycles we would expect to nd per 1000 years. This is then converted to show how many
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years we would spend in di¤erent cycles per 1000 years for both materials prices and output. We also
report the average cycle length.
The most telling statistic that emerges from these tables is that according to this model we will spend
just over two thirds of our lives, on average, in a very long cycle, whose length is around 42 years. The
distribution of cycles for materials prices and output are quite di¤erent; those for output are slightly
larger in length. We spend 785 years per thousand in a 49-year output cycle (the average length of long
cycles over 22 years long), as against 608 years per thousand in a 36-year commodity price cycle. This
means that two thirds of the time we are enjoying a long cycle whose average full length, both down
and up, is around 42 years. Of course there are a much higher percentage of shorter cycles, but as they
last so much less time they are of little importance overall.
Materials Prices (Linear Detrended) Percentage of cycles with length [a,b]
Cycle Length Average [1,3] [4,6] [7,9] [10,12] [13,15] [16,18] [19,21] 22+
18.22 9.87 13.66 10.80 9.11 9.32 8.20 7.04 32.00
Materials Prices (Linear Detrended) Frequency of cycles with length [a,b]
[1,3] [4,6] [7,9] [10,12] [13,15] [16,18] [19,21] 22+
Number of cycles per 1000 years 5.16 7.14 5.65 4.76 4.87 4.29 3.68 16.73
Number of years spent in cycle of length 10.32 35.71 45.18 52.41 68.24 72.86 73.61 607.57
Output (Linear Detrended) Percentage of cycles with length [a,b]
Cycle Length Average [1,3] [4,6] [7,9] [10,12] [13,15] [16,18] [19,21] 22+
30.92 8.73 9.22 6.18 5.37 5.48 5.13 4.50 55.39
Output (Linear Detrended) Frequency of cycles with length [a,b]
[1,3] [4,6] [7,9] [10,12] [13,15] [16,18] [19,21] 22+
Number of cycles per 1000 years 2.53 2.67 1.79 1.55 1.59 1.49 1.30 16.05
Number of years spent in cycle of length 5.06 13.36 14.32 17.10 22.24 25.29 26.05 785.01
Table 6: Frequency of Cycles
Figure 14 shows the histogram of cycle lengths. From this we can clearly see there is an abundance of
long cycles for both variables. The histograms also conrm that the output cycles are longer on average,
with some cycles even being as long as 100 years.
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Figure 14: Histograms of Cycle Lengths
5 The role of new monetary rules
What reformed monetary rules could stabilise this world economy? Given that monetary policy per-
mitted massive business cycles which caused considerable disruption, we consider the e¤ectiveness of
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a straightforward Friedman k-percent rule and then go on to look at various Taylor Rules, including
enhanced ones targeting the Price Level and Nominal GDP (i.e di¤ering by targeting the integral of
ination instead of the level; output is targeted in the same way in terms of the level of the output
gap). It is noteworthy that the original estimated money supply growth rule is highly accommodative
of ination (the response of money growth to the ination rate is 1.24) but leans against output (with
a response of -0.009).
var(output) var(ination) Welfare Loss
Original 0:00346 0:00860 0:01206
Friedman k% Rule 0:00268 0:00612 0:00881
Taylor Rule 0:00729 0:00035 0:00764
NGDPT Rule* 0:01990 0:00389 0:02378
PLT Rule* 0:02056 0:00396 0:02452
MS Rule* 0:00411 0:00167 0:00578
Rules dened
Taylor Rule rt = 0:99rt 1 + 3:0t + 0:0(lnYFt   lnYMCAPt)
NGDPT Rule rt = 0:1rt 1 + 2:2(lnYFt + lnPt   (lnYMCAPt + lnP t )
PLT Rule rt = 0:1rt 1 + 2:7(lnPt   lnP t )
MS Rule  lnMt = c5 + ams1 t   a
ms
2 (lnYFt   lnYMCAPt)
 0:3(lnPt   lnP

t )  0:1(lnYFt + lnPt   (lnYMCAPt + lnP

t ))
*all these rules violated the zero lower bound on interest rates badly see text
Table 7: Welfare Loss for Monetary Policy Rules
We measure their e¤ectiveness in stabilising the economy with a crude welfare measure of volatilty,
the unweighted variance of HP-detrended output and ination. Using this measure, the Friedman Rule
is more benecial than the estimated rule. It slightly reduces both the variance of output and ination
as can be seen in Table 7.
If we supplement the estimated rule with a corrective response to a Nominal GDP or Price Level
target, output volatility rises substantially with only a small improvement in ination volatility. Fur-
thermore, we must also note the behaviour of interest rates under these rules. It turns out that the
apparently most successful rule  the MS rule which besides the usual money supply reactions found in
the data, also responds to the level of prices and nominal GDP  pushes interest rates well into negative
territory much of the time as it struggles to push the economy back towards full commodity capacity
utilisation. The same is true of the other rules that respond to the price level or nominal GDP. Hence
e¤ectively we must ignore these rules as impossible to enforce due to the lower interest rate bound.
The Taylor Rule also appears to be successful in reducing macro variance; but on inspection it too is
incredible as it involves a large short term response to ination and very long persistence in this response,
implying a long run response of 300! Not surprisingly it achieves a huge reduction of ination variance
but at the expense of a tripling of output variance compared with the Friedman Rule.
It turns out that this Friedman Rule, simply xing the money supply growth at a constant is the
best rule over our sample period. Interestingly, the Friedman Rule is not much di¤erent from the money
supply rule we have estimated for the whole period. This only di¤ers by having a small positive response
(0.17) to ination and a very small negative response (-0.01) to the output gap.
This greatly contrasts with the ndings of Le et al. (2016b) for the recent post-war period since the
mid-1980s where we found that a Taylor Rule targeting either the price level or Nominal GDP did by far
the best job in stabilising the economy. However, of course this recent period, with its hugely developed
markets in liquidity, represents a very di¤erent monetary world from the average over the last 150 years.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Robustness of the estimated model to the data denitions
As mentioned earlier our data for world output, interest rates, money and consumer prices was limited
to an average of US and UK data. However, plainly, the importance of other countries in the world totals
was non-trivial and rose through the sample. Accordingly we created new replacement data series for
these which included all countries on a GDP-weighted basis using data from the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor
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Macrohistory Database (Jordà et al. 2017)4 . Our objective was to see if our model would pass our
stringent Indirect Inference Wald test on this reworked data. From the results shown in Table 8 it can be
seen that the same model passes the test even at a slightly higher level of condence. For good measure
we show the variance decomposition in Table 9 which is more or less identical to our original variance
decomposition in Table 5. There is therefore no reason to change the model from what we have already
examined in some detail.
Data
US-UK Full Weighted
Wald 37:0794 35:0566
Transformed Wald 1:5145 1:4081
p-value 0:057 0:079
Table 8: Robustness Model Test
PMt YMCAPt YFt Mt Pt t Rt
Materials Productivity shock 11:60 99:24 79:22 21:21 77:56 64:09 28:985
IS Curve shock 0:50 0:00 0:10 0:22 0:81 2:42 36:04
Money Demand shock 0:02 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:08 0:12 0:35
Money Supply growth shock 0:53 0:00 0:10 69:61 6:61 3:22 0:30
Phillips Curve shock 87:35 0:76 20:58 8:94 14:94 30:15 34:33
Table 9: Robustness Variance Decomposition
6.2 Robustness of the policy results to potential model error
We can now use the results from our Monte Carlo power table above (Table 4) to carry out a robustness
assessment of the model. We want to know for sure how misleading our results could be at worst
if assailed by general inaccuracy. Plainly parameter estimation which we have carried out by indirect
inference is subject to estimation bias in small samples; and so it is possible that our parameter estimates
are not the true ones, even though we have found in general that this estimation bias is encouragingly
small (Le et al, 2016a). Our power analysis indicates that the falsity of these parameters cannot exceed
13% or we would have rejected our model. We can now ask about our policy analysis over this historical
period whether it could have been a¤ected by this falsity being at its highest possible. So we redo our
monetary policy rule evaluation with a set of parameters that are at this extreme of falsity. The results
are shown in Table 10.
If we simply focus on the results for the Original estimated rule and the Friedman Rule, it can be
seen that they hardly di¤er: both yield somewhat more instability, but the conclusions remain the same,
that a Friedman Rule is the best.
var(output) var(ination) Welfare Loss
Original 0:00307 0:01279 0:01586
Friedman Rule 0:00244 0:00859 0:01103
Table 10: Welfare Loss for Monetary Policy Rules with Maximum False Model
7 Conclusions
In this paper we looked for a theory that could account for considerable evidence of a long wave com-
modity cycle in the world economy. We set up a DSGE model in which there is a long time (10 years)
4There are two hyper-ination episodes (Germany 1920s, Japan 1940s) which if included considerably distort the con-
sumer price series; both end with a currency reform which in principle returns the price level to parity with world prices.
We have treated them as if throughout these two episodes prices were at world parity or dollarised. Indeed currency
substitution was likely to have been substantial; these countries residents were substituting out of their home currency
into either currency-substitutes or barter, and the home currency prices therefore represent only a proportion of actual
exchange transactions, possibly a small proportion, of which unfortunately we have no estimate.
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needed to build a materials mine, a Phillips Curve, a forward-looking IS Curve and an LM curve. We
estimated this model by indirect inference which passed the Wald test comfortably and found that the
model generates a world in which we spend much of our time in long cycles. An example of such a cycle
is the world economy from 1980 to 2007 where a commodity peak (1980) was followed by 3 decades of
rst falling, then very low, and nally sharply rising commodity prices, peaking in 2007. The two main
shocks driving output are those for materials productivity (which dominates commodity production)
and the Phillips Curve (which dominates ination). The money supply growth shock was important for
output in the 1930s but otherwise feeds mainly into ination.
The estimated monetary policy rule was one in which the money supply growth rate slightly accom-
modates ination and leans very slightly against the output gap. We found that Friedmans k-percent
rule would have stabilised the world economy a bit better.
We conclude that this theory and evidence point to a need for macroeconomists to give a signicant
role in macro models to the long-gestation commodity sector.
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